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Coming Out of the Venire: Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination and the Peremptory Challenge 
Jessica Satinoff*
 We, the people, declare today that the most evident of truths—that 
all of us are created equal—is the star that guides us still; just as it 
guided our forebears through Seneca Falls, and Selma, and 
Stonewall . . . . It is now our generation’s task to carry on what 
those pioneers began. . . . Our journey is not complete until our 
gay brothers and sisters are treated like anyone else under the law. 
––President Barack Obama1
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution provides that all criminal defendants 
are entitled to a speedy and public trial before a fair and impartial jury.2 In 
order to ensure that the accused receive an impartial jury, peremptory 
challenges allow a party to remove potentially biased members of the jury 
pool during voir dire.3 Voir dire allows lawyers to inquire into the 
prospective jurors’ attitudes, beliefs, morals, and views related to issues that 
will likely arise during trial.4 Historically, there have only been two 
limitations on a party’s ability to strike a potential juror through the 
peremptory challenge: race and gender.5 One would be hard-pressed to 
contend that sexual orientation should not be a third.6
Batson v. Kentucky, decided in 1986, first established that peremptory 
challenges may not be exercised to remove a prospective juror solely based 
        *   J.D. candidate, 2016, Florida International University College of Law; B.A., 2012, University 
of Central Florida. I would like to thank my mother, Miryam, for her unconditional support and 
encouragement. I would also like to thank Professor Howard Wasserman for his guidance throughout 
the writing process. Finally, a special thanks to the editors of the FIU Law Review for publishing my 
Note. 
1  President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013). 
2  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3 See Jason Matthew Lamb, The Constitution, Peremptory Challenges, and United States v. 
Martinez-Salazar, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 843, 843 (2001). 
4 See id.
5 See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 
U.S. 127 (1994).
6 See Giovanna Shay, In the Box: Voir Dire on LGBT Issues in Changing Times, 37 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 407, 451 (2014). 
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on race.7 In 1994, the Court established the second limitation on a party’s 
ability to strike a potential juror through peremptory challenges.8 In J.E.B. 
v. Alabama, the Court held that gender was also an unconstitutional proxy 
for determining a juror’s competence and impartiality.9 The Court reasoned 
that gender discrimination during voir dire perpetuates invidious and 
antiquated stereotypes regarding the aptitude of men and women.10 To date, 
Batson has only applied to discrimination during voir dire based on race 
and gender.11 In recent years, however, sexual orientation discrimination 
has generated significant legal headway.12 In United States v. Windsor, for 
example, the Supreme Court struck down the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act’s (DOMA) ban on recognizing same-sex marriages.13 The Court 
affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment, which applied heightened scrutiny 
to DOMA’s classification based on sexual orientation.14
Although the Court never expressly stated that it was applying 
heightened judicial review, its ruling indicates implicit application of 
heightened scrutiny.15 This is evinced by the majority’s position on the 
meaning of the constitutional guarantee of equality—“that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify 
disparate treatment of the group.”16 The Court went on to explain that 
discrimination of such an unusual character requires careful consideration, 
which indicates its application of a standard higher than rational basis 
review to scrutinize sexual orientation classifications.17 Several courts, 
including the Ninth Circuit, have held that the logic and reasoning of 
Windsor implicitly requires the application of heightened scrutiny to equal 
protection claims involving sexual orientation.18
Federal circuit courts of appeals have expressed opposing views 
regarding the applicability of Batson to peremptory strikes based on sexual 
orientation. The Ninth Circuit, in SmithKline Beecham Corporation v. 
Abbott Laboratories, recently held that peremptory strikes used to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation may be challenged under 
7 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. 
8 See generally J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127.
9 See id. at 129. 
10 See id. at 130–31. 
11 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 79. 
12 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
13 See id.
14 See id. at 2684. 
15 See Shay, supra note 6, at 451. 
16 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
17 See id.
18 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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Batson.19 Yet, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Ehrmann, and the 
Eleventh Circuit, in Sneed v. Florida Department of Corrections, expressed 
serious doubt as to whether Batson’s scope extends beyond race and 
gender.20
Batson should be extended to sexual orientation discrimination 
because such discrimination is simply a form of gender discrimination, 
which is already prohibited by the Court’s decision in J.E.B. v. Alabama.21
If conduct is prohibited when engaged in by a person of one gender, yet 
permitted when engaged in by a person of the opposite gender, then, by 
definition, such a prohibition is discriminatorily based on sex and 
traditional gender roles.22 In the alternative, Batson challenges should be 
applicable to discrimination based on sexual orientation because of the 
similarities between gender and sexual orientation, as well as the equal 
protection implications found in Windsor.23 The Ninth Circuit holding in 
SmithKline, while not binding on other circuits, is highly persuasive and 
should be adopted by all other circuits in light of the Windsor decision.
Because the Court in Windsor implied that sexual orientation is subject to 
heightened scrutiny review, peremptory strikes on this basis should be 
afforded the same protections as race and gender during voir dire.24
This Note will examine the equal protection implications of Windsor
and consider the rationale for extending the Batson analysis to sexual 
orientation discrimination. Part II of this Note will provide a history of 
peremptory challenges in the United States and the evolution of the Batson
analysis. This Part will also address the various competing interests that 
should be considered, including the rights of the litigant and the excluded 
juror. Part III will discuss sexual orientation discrimination jurisprudence, 
the standard of judicial review for sexual orientation, and the rationale for 
applying heightened scrutiny to classifications that single out individuals 
for disparate treatment based on their sexual orientation. Part IV will 
analyze peremptory challenges in relation to sexual orientation and the 
circuit split among various federal circuit courts of appeals regarding the 
applicability of Batson to peremptory challenges solely based on sexual 
orientation. This Part will also discuss the rationale supporting the 
extension of Batson to sexual orientation. Part V will provide 
19 See id. at 471. 
20 See United States v. Ehrmann, 421 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Sneed v. Fla. Dep’t. of 
Corr., 496 Fed. App’x 20 (11th Cir. 2012). 
21 See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.L. REV. 197, 198 (1994). 
22 See id. at 208. 
23 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Women’s Exclusion from the Constitutional Canon, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1715, 1731–32 (2013). 
24 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 471. 
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recommendations to eliminate sexual orientation discrimination during voir
dire and conclude with potential consequences if the Supreme Court does 
not adopt these recommendations. 
II. BACKGROUND
A.  History of the Peremptory Challenge 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a 
trial by an impartial jury.25 To impanel such a jury, lawyers engage in the 
process of voir dire, during which each lawyer is afforded the opportunity 
to question jurors and decide which prospective jurors will be selected to 
hear the case.26 Prior to the commencement of trial, each party’s lawyer 
attempts to identify potential jurors that may be biased and have such jurors 
struck, either for cause or through a peremptory challenge.27 Parties may 
exercise an unlimited amount of challenges for cause, which are used to 
excuse prospective jurors who are unlikely to be fair and impartial during 
the case being heard.28 In order to exercise a challenge for cause, a party 
must provide the court with an explanation for challenging the juror, and 
the judge must then decide whether the prospective juror should be 
removed based on his or her inability to be fair and impartial.29
The peremptory challenge, as distinguished from the challenge for 
cause, allows a party to strike a prospective juror from the venire without 
providing the court any justification for the strike.30 Essentially, a party 
exercises a peremptory challenge when the party believes that a prospective 
juror will be biased for reasons that cannot be articulated to the court.31
While a party may typically exercise peremptory challenges without cause, 
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits parties from exercising peremptory 
challenges solely on account of race or an assumption that racial minorities 
as a whole will be unable to serve as impartial jurors in a case against a 
racial minority defendant.32 The peremptory challenge was further limited 
based on the Court’s finding that gender has no bearing on an individual’s 
25  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
26 See JAMES J. GOBERT ET AL., JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING
A JURY § 10:1 (Westlaw). 
27 See id.
28 See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and 
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 447 (1996). 
29 See id.
30 See Coburn R. Beck, The Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 961, 963 (1998). 
31 See Kathryn Ann Barry, Striking Back Against Homophobia: Prohibiting Peremptory Strikes 
Based on Sexual Orientation, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 157, 160 (2001). 
32  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). 
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competence and ability to serve as an impartial juror.33 Today, a party may 
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove prospective jurors for any 
reason, aside from the individual’s race or gender.34
The number of peremptory challenges each party may exercise is 
defined by statute and, therefore, varies by jurisdiction and case type.35 In 
federal criminal cases, courts allow twenty peremptory challenges per party 
in a capital case, six peremptory challenges for the government and ten for 
the defendant in all other felony cases, and three peremptory challenges per 
party in misdemeanor cases.36 In all civil cases, federal courts allow each 
party to exercise three peremptory challenges.37 Most states have enacted 
statutes that permit parties to exercise peremptory challenges in similar 
numbers and type as the federal courts.38
Originally, the peremptory challenge was established to eliminate 
unqualified and biased members from the jury pool.39 Peremptories date 
back to Roman times and were implemented under English common law as 
well.40 The British peremptory challenge was brought to the early American 
colonies and was subsequently adopted by all states.41 Initially, most states 
regarded the peremptory challenge as a right of the defendant and were 
slow to extend this right to the prosecution.42 Since its inception, the 
peremptory challenge has been rooted in the tradition of the United States 
and has served as an indispensable tool for impaneling an impartial jury.43
The peremptory challenge ensures fairness during jury selection, 
complements challenges for cause, and safeguards the voir dire process 
from biased jurors.44 It serves to eliminate extreme bias and prejudice on 
both sides of a case, as well as to “assure the parties that the jurors before 
whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed 
before them, and not otherwise.”45 In her concurring opinion in J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, Justice O’Connor opined that the significance of the peremptory 
challenge is evinced by its establishment during the time of Blackstone and 
33 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994). 
34 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89; J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. 
35 See Beck, supra note 30, at 964. 
36  FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
37  FED. R. CIV. P. 47.
38 See Beck, supra note 30, at 964. 
39 See Vivien Toomey Montz & Craig Lee Montz, The Peremptory Challenge: Should It Still 
Exist? An Examination of Federal and Florida Law, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451, 454 (2000).
40 See Patricia Henley, Improving the Jury System: Peremptory Challenges, PUBLIC LAW RES.
INST., http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/plri/juryper.pdf. 
41 See Montz & Montz, supra note 39, at 455. 
42 See id.
43 See Henley, supra note 40. 
44 See id.
45  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). 
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 93 Side B      06/27/2016   12:34:37
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 93 Side B      06/27/2016   12:34:37
C M
Y K
10 - SATINOFF_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/16 11:52 PM
468 FIU Law Review [Vol. 11:463 
its continued endurance in all the states.46 Traditionally, peremptory 
challenges allowed parties to exclude a prospective juror for any reason;
however, the Court’s evolving jurisprudence has placed limitations on the 
peremptory challenge.47 Today, parties may object to a peremptory 
challenge if they believe that the opposing party discriminatorily exercised 
the peremptory challenge to exclude the member from the venire solely 
based on race or gender.48
B. Evolution of Batson v. Kentucky
Batson, a landmark Supreme Court case, established the framework 
that prevents peremptory challenges from being used discriminatorily 
during voir dire.49 In Batson, an African-American man was accused of 
committing burglary and receiving stolen goods.50 During jury selection, 
the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four African-
American individuals, resulting in a jury comprised solely of white 
individuals.51 Batson was found guilty on both counts and appealed his 
conviction, arguing, inter alia, that the prosecutor discriminatorily 
exercised peremptory challenges to remove individuals from the venire 
solely because of their race.52 The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his 
conviction, holding that a defendant must demonstrate systematic exclusion 
of a group of prospective jurors in order to allege lack of a fair cross-section 
of individuals serving on the jury.53
The Supreme Court of the United States held that if the trial court 
found that the facts established prima facie purposeful discrimination, and 
the prosecutor did not provide a neutral explanation for his action, Batson’s 
conviction must be reversed.54 The Court reasoned that the Equal Protection 
Clause forbids the prosecutor from striking potential jurors solely based on 
their race because it denies a defendant “the protection that a trial by jury is 
intended to secure.”55 The Court highlighted its prior efforts to eradicate 
invidious racial discrimination during voir dire and noted that such 
discrimination harms not only the accused, but also the community at 
46 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
47 See Esther J. Last, Peremptory Challenges to Jurors Based on Sexual Orientation: 
Preempting Discrimination by Court Rule, 48 IND. L. REV. 313, 315–16 (2014). 
48 See id.
49 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
50 See id. at 82. 
51 See id. at 83. 
52 See id.
53 See id. at 84. 
54 See id. at 100. 
55 Id. at 86. 
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large.56 Ultimately, the Court held that peremptory challenges may not be 
used to strike a prospective juror solely on the basis of race because 
practices that intentionally bar individuals from serving on juries due to 
their race “undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of 
justice.”57
Today, the Batson challenge is commonly understood as one party’s 
objection that an opposing party has exercised a peremptory challenge to 
remove a prospective juror from the venire exclusively on account of race 
or gender.58 The principle of Batson now applies in both criminal and civil 
cases.59 Procedurally, a party may raise a Batson challenge as soon as it 
believes the opposing party has exercised a peremptory challenge 
discriminatorily to remove a potential juror.60 Once the jury has been 
impaneled, asserting a Batson challenge would be superfluous because the 
excluded juror can no longer serve on that jury.61 If the court denies a 
party’s Batson challenge, this issue may be raised on appeal, so long as the 
record has been adequately preserved for appellate review.62
The legal significance of the Court’s decision in Batson is two-fold. 
First, the Court established a three-part inquiry to determine whether 
impermissible discrimination has occurred against a potential juror during 
voir dire.63 In order to establish that such discrimination has occurred, the 
party challenging the peremptory strike must first establish a prima facie
case of intentional discrimination.64 The striking party must then provide a 
neutral, nondiscriminatory reason for the strike.65 Finally, the court must 
decide, based on the record, whether the party raising the challenge has 
demonstrated intentional discrimination.66
Second, Batson established the elements necessary to make a prima
facie showing of intentional discrimination during jury selection. First, the 
challenging party must demonstrate that he or she is a member of an 
identifiable group and that the striking party has exercised peremptory 
challenges to excuse members of the challenging party’s group from the 
56 See id. at 85. 
57 Id. at 87, 89. 
58 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (9th ed. 2009). 
59 See id.
60 See Clair F. Rush, How to Make and Defend Against a Batson Challenge, DRI (Mar. 14, 
2012), www.dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=299. 
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). 
64 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 476 (9th Cir. 2014). 
65 See id.
66 See id.
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jury pool.67 Second, the challenging party must prove that the facts and 
surrounding circumstances raise an inference that the striking party actually 
did exercise peremptory challenges to remove the prospective jurors 
exclusively based on their membership in the cognizable group.68
Under the Equal Protection Clause, a defendant may also raise a 
Batson challenge to the exclusion of jurors based on race, regardless of 
whether the defendant and the prospective jurors are members of the same 
race.69 In Powers v. Ohio, the defendant, a white male, objected when the 
prosecution exercised six of its ten peremptory challenges to remove black 
individuals from the jury pool.70 The trial court overruled Powers’ 
objections, and he was convicted of murder.71 The Supreme Court held that 
a defendant may raise a third-party equal protection claim for jurors 
excused solely based on their race.72
Almost a decade after Batson, J.E.B. v. Alabama extended the three-
part analysis to gender-based discrimination.73 In J.E.B., Alabama filed a 
petition on behalf of the mother of a minor child to establish paternity and 
child support against J.E.B.74 The State exercised nine of its ten peremptory 
challenges to excuse male jurors, and J.E.B. exercised all but one of his 
challenges to excuse female jurors.75 The resulting jury was comprised 
solely of female jurors.76 The jury found J.E.B. to be the minor child’s 
father, and the court ordered him to pay child support.77 The Supreme Court 
held that “gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror 
competence and impartiality.”78 The Court noted that the logic of Batson
also forbids purposeful discrimination on account of gender because such 
discrimination perpetuates “invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes 
about the relative abilities of men and women,” in contravention to the 
Equal Protection Clause.79 The Court explained that excluding cognizable 
groups from serving on juries is inconsistent with the constitutional 
construct of trial by jury.80
67 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 80. 
68 See id.
69 See generally Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
70 See id. at 403. 
71 See id.
72 See id. at 410. 
73 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
74 See id. at 129. 
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 129, 131. 
80 See id. at 134. 
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 95 Side A      06/27/2016   12:34:37
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 95 Side A      06/27/2016   12:34:37
C M
Y K
10 - SATINOFF_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/16 11:52 PM
2016] Coming Out of the Venire 471 
Gender discrimination is a relatively recent phenomenon because 
women were historically precluded from serving on juries.81 The Court 
observed that, while the discrimination that women and racial minorities 
have experienced in the United States have not been identical, the 
similarities between the groups’ experiences support the extension of the 
Batson analysis to discrimination based on gender.82 The Court recognized 
that women, much like African-Americans, have experienced a history of 
exclusion and discrimination in American society.83 As it did in Batson, the 
Court affirmed the notion that discrimination during jury selection harms 
not only the litigants, but also the community and prospective jurors who 
are prohibited from participating in the judicial process.84 Ultimately, the 
Court held that gender-based discrimination during voir dire does not 
further the State’s interest in achieving a fair and impartial jury.85
While the Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized the 
peremptory challenge as a fundamental instrument in obtaining an impartial 
jury, not all justices have taken the same position.86 In his dissent in J.E.B. 
v. Alabama, Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s position that peremptory 
challenges based on any cognizable group subject to heightened scrutiny are 
inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of equal protection.87 Scalia 
argued that because all classes are subject to peremptory challenges, 
essentially no class is denied equal protection.88 Strongly opposing the 
Court’s reasoning in J.E.B., Scalia noted that for every male that was 
excused by the government, the petitioner excused a female.89 Therefore, 
Scalia concluded that there was no gender discrimination, because both 
genders were being excused through peremptory challenges 
evenhandedly.90
Scalia would have likely opposed extending Batson to sexual 
orientation, just as he opposed applying it to gender, because peremptory 
challenges have existed in conjunction with the Equal Protection Clause for 
over a century.91 Because peremptory challenges are used to excuse both 
heterosexuals and homosexuals equally, Scalia would have likely argued 
that neither group is denied equal protection under the Fourteenth 
81 See id. at 131. 
82 See id. at 135. 
83 See id. at 136. 
84 See id. at 140. 
85 See id. at 143. 
86 See Montz & Montz, supra note 39, at 455–56. 
87 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 159 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
88 See id.
89 See id. at 159–60. 
90 See id. at 160. 
91 See id. at 159. 
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Amendment.92 This argument, however, fails to consider the emphasis that 
our society has placed on eliminating invidious discrimination entirely, as 
exemplified by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.93
C.  Balancing Interests During Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges 
In Batson and its progeny, the Court has had to balance several 
interests in prohibiting the discriminatory exercise of peremptory 
challenges during voir dire.94 The first, and most significant interest, is the 
defendant or civil litigant’s constitutional right to a fair trial before an 
impartial jury.95 The Court has held that the State violates the Equal 
Protection Clause when members of the defendant’s race have been 
intentionally excluded from serving on the jury.96 Such discrimination 
violates a defendant’s equal protection rights because it contravenes the 
very safeguard that a trial by jury is intended to provide.97
Second, when a prospective juror is excused through a peremptory 
challenge, the juror’s rights are at stake as well.98 The Court has recognized 
that preventing a prospective juror from participating in the administration 
of justice solely based on race or gender is unconstitutional discrimination 
against the excluded juror.99 Allowing citizens to contribute to the judicial 
process has long been regarded as a fundamental justification for preserving 
the trial by jury system in the United States.100 Courts have recognized that 
jurors have privacy interests during jury selection, and have begun to 
impose greater restrictions on the scope of voir dire questioning based on 
such privacy interests.101
Finally, the Court has often commented on the far-reaching 
consequences of discriminatory practices during jury selection.102 In 
addition to the harm that such discrimination inflicts upon litigants and 
excluded jurors, discriminatory peremptory challenges undermine public 
92 See id. at 160.
93 See generally U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. 
94 See Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily Waive 
Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 401–06 (2010). 
95 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (1986). 
96 See id. at 85.
97 See id. at 86. 
98 See id.
99 See id. at 87; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 127 (1994).
100 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991). 
101 See Paul R. Lynd, Juror Sexual Orientation: The Fair Cross-Section Requirement, Privacy, 
Challenges for Cause, and Peremptories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 231, 258 (1998). 
102 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. 
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confidence in the fairness of the judicial system.103 Ultimately, 
discrimination during jury selection “offends the dignity of persons and the 
integrity of the courts.”104
III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
A.  Sexual Orientation Discrimination Jurisprudence 
The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community has 
experienced both private and public discrimination throughout history.105
While private discrimination is difficult to remedy, public discrimination 
that singles out sexual minorities based on their sexual orientation should be 
eliminated.106 Despite the constitutional guarantees of equality, the LGBT 
community is a minority group that is still subject to government-
sanctioned discrimination today.107 While society as a whole has shifted 
toward acceptance of homosexuality, many individuals continue to harbor 
negative attitudes toward sexual minorities, which harm the LGBT 
community in public ways.108
The Supreme Court first addressed discrimination based on sexual 
orientation approximately thirty years ago in Bowers v. Hardwick.109 In 
Bowers, the Court upheld a state statute that criminalized sodomy, 
reasoning that disapproval of homosexual conduct was deeply rooted in the 
tradition of our country, and that the State had a legitimate interest in 
prohibiting such conduct.110 This case is illustrative of society’s historical 
moral disapproval of sexual minorities and the history of discrimination 
they have endured.111 Approximately ten years later, there was a sea change 
in the Court’s sexual orientation discrimination jurisprudence.112 In Romer
v. Evans, the Court invalidated a state constitutional amendment that sought 
to prohibit government protection of sexual orientation.113 The Court 
implicitly authorized state antidiscrimination statutes to include sexual 
orientation as a protected class, but only applied rational basis review in 
103 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87; see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140. 
104 Powers, 499 U.S. at 402. 
105 See Eric A. Roberts, Heightened Scrutiny Under the Equal Protection Clause: A Remedy to 
Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 485, 486 (1993). 
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id. at 498. 
109 See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
110 See Andrea L. Claus, The Sex Less Scrutinized: The Case for Suspect Classification for 
Sexual Orientation, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 151, 156 (2011). 
111 See id.
112 See id. at 157. 
113 See id.
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doing so.114 Scholars have argued that the Court’s treatment of sexual 
minorities as a class under the Equal Protection Clause prompted several 
states to amend their antidiscrimination statutes to include sexual 
orientation as a protected class.115
The Court eventually overruled Bowers in the notable case of 
Lawrence v. Texas.116 Lawrence was convicted for engaging in “deviate 
sexual intercourse” with a member of the same sex, in violation of a state 
statute outlawing same-sex sexual conduct.117 Although Lawrence was 
decided on due process, rather than equal protection grounds, it represents 
the first Supreme Court ruling in which the Court defined sexual minorities 
as being a cognizable group, which supports the application of heightened 
judicial review.118 The progression of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding sexual orientation discrimination demonstrates the shift in public 
attitudes toward sexual minorities.119 The Bowers decision reflected 
society’s historical moral disapproval of homosexuality, while Romer and
Lawrence evinced society’s shifting views toward acceptance of 
homosexuality.120 Despite this societal shift, sexual minorities still 
experience discriminatory treatment in housing, public accommodations, 
and the workplace today.121 This discrimination reflects the need to provide 
heightened protection for sexual orientation classifications under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
B.  Standard of Judicial Review for Sexual Orientation 
Traditionally, discrimination based on sexual orientation was subject 
to rational basis judicial review by the Supreme Court.122 Although the 
Court has heard several cases pertaining to sexual orientation 
discrimination, it has generally applied rational basis review,123 or declined 
to explicitly state what level of judicial review it was applying.124 Because 
of the ambiguity created by recent Supreme Court decisions, it is helpful to 
consider the emerging trend of state courts applying heightened scrutiny to 
114 See id.
115 See id. at 157–58. 
116 See id. at 158. 
117 Id.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 161. 
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
123 See generally Bowers, 478 U.S. 186; Romer, 517 U.S. 620. 
124 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015).
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classifications that discriminate based on sexual orientation.125 According to 
a fifty-state survey provided by the American Bar Association, at least five 
states protect jurors from discrimination based on their sexual orientation, 
as of 2013.126
In 2008, the California Supreme Court became the first high court in 
the country to hold that classifications discriminating based on sexual 
orientation deserve the same protections under the law as classifications 
based on race and gender.127 In reaching its decision, the court explained 
that there was no persuasive reason to apply a less rigorous standard for 
statutes that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation than the standard 
applied to statutes that classify on the basis of race or gender.128 The court 
reasoned that 
[b]ecause sexual orientation, like gender, race, or religion, is a 
characteristic that frequently has been the basis for biased and 
improperly stereotypical treatment and that generally bears no relation 
to an individual’s ability to perform or contribute to society, it is 
appropriate for courts to evaluate with great care and with 
considerable skepticism any statute that embodies such a 
classification.129
Although this case was later superseded by constitutional amendment, it 
demonstrates the paradigm shift in societal views toward classifications 
based on sexual orientation.130
Subsequently, the Connecticut Supreme Court also held that sexual 
orientation is a quasi-suspect class under the Connecticut Constitution.131 In 
its analysis, the Connecticut Supreme Court delineated factors for 
determining whether a classification is suspect or quasi-suspect, including 
whether a class has experienced a history of discrimination, whether the 
characteristic associated with that class is related to an individual’s ability 
to participate and contribute to society, whether the characteristic is central 
to an individual’s personal identity, and whether the class is a minority or 
lacks political power.132 The court found that members of the LGBT 
community are a minority class that have suffered a history of 
125 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 783-84 (2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009); Griego v. Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, 316 P.3d 865, 884 (N.M. 2013). 
126 See Shmuel Bushwick, Excluding Gay Jurors After Windsor, AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. OF LITIG.
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/lgbt/articles/fall2013-1113-excluding-
gay-jurors-after-windsor.html.
127 See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 783–84. 
128 See id.
129 Id. at 757 (emphasis added). 
130 See Shay, supra note 6, at 411. 
131 See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 289 Conn. 135, 141 (2008). 
132 See id. at 165–66. 
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discrimination and held that laws discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.133
High courts across the United States began applying heightened 
judicial review to classifications based on sexual orientation, much like 
California and Connecticut.134 In 2009, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that 
classifications discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation are subject 
to heightened scrutiny, without specifying whether it was applying 
intermediate or strict scrutiny.135 The court observed that members of the 
LGBT community have suffered from centuries of public discrimination.136
Accordingly, the court held that in order to prevent the perpetuation of 
historical prejudice and stereotyping, laws that single out individuals for 
disparate treatment based on sexual orientation are subject to heightened 
judicial review.137
In 2013, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that intermediate 
scrutiny should be applied to classifications based on sexual orientation 
because the LGBT community is an identifiable class that has suffered from 
a history of intentional discrimination and has not been able to protect itself 
from such discrimination through the legal system.138 The court reasoned 
that because an individual’s sexual orientation is so essential to one’s 
identity, it would be inappropriate to require an individual to alter his or her 
sexual orientation to avoid discrimination.139
While many state supreme courts have held that classifications on the 
basis of sexual orientation are subject to heightened scrutiny, this position 
has not been uniformly adopted by all high courts across the country. The 
Washington Supreme Court, for example, held that sexual orientation 
discrimination is not subject to heightened scrutiny.140 The court refused to 
apply heightened scrutiny because sexual orientation has not been declared 
immutable, and because the implementation of provisions providing 
protections to the LGBT community in Washington demonstrates that they 
are not powerless, but are actually exercising substantial political power.141
The Maryland Court of Appeals similarly held that classifications based on 
sexual orientation are not subject to heightened scrutiny.142
133 See id. at 179. 
134 See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); see also Griego v. Oliver, 316 
P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013). 
135 See, e.g., Varnum, 763 N.W.2d 862; see also Griego, 316 P.3d 865. 
136 See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 896. 
137 See id.
138 See Griego, 316 P.3d at 884. 
139 See id.
140 See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 975 (2006). 
141 See id. at 974-75. 
142 See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 605 (2007). 
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In a press release from the Attorney General prior to the Supreme 
Court ruling in United States v. Windsor, the Executive Branch adopted the 
position that sexual orientation classifications should be subject to 
heightened review.143 In evaluating the aforementioned factors articulated 
by the Supreme Court, the Attorney General first recognized that there has 
been a significant history of purposeful discrimination against the LGBT 
community, by both the government and private entities.144 Such 
discrimination is rooted in prejudice and stereotypes that continue to harm 
the LGBT community today.145 Second, the Attorney General noted that 
although sexual orientation is not readily apparent, it is widely accepted 
within the scientific community to be an immutable characteristic.146 Courts 
have held that because it is so central to one’s identity, it would be unfair to 
require an individual to conceal their sexual orientation in order to avoid 
discriminatory treatment.147
Third, laws enacted by the government that promote discrimination 
based on sexual orientation demonstrate that members of the LGBT 
community lack political power and the “ability to attract the [favorable] 
attention of the lawmakers.”148 Such laws include those at issue in Romer
and Lawrence, as well as discrimination based on sexual orientation in the 
military and workplace.149 Finally, sexual orientation “bears no relation to 
ability to perform or contribute to society.”150 This is supported by the 
repeal of discriminatory legislation regarding sexual orientation, the 
evolution of the Court’s sexual orientation jurisprudence, and social science 
studies explaining that an individual’s sexual orientation does not hinder his 
or her ability to contribute to society.151
In 2013, the Supreme Court ultimately struck down DOMA in United 
States v. Windsor.152 The Court held that DOMA violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, as applied to the Federal Government through the Fifth 
Amendment.153 In its reasoning, the Court explained that “DOMA’s 
principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and 
143 See Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of 
Marriage Act, DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 23, 2011), www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-
litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 Id.
149 See id.
150 Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality)). 
151 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 143. 
152 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
153 See id. at 2683.
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 98 Side B      06/27/2016   12:34:37
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 98 Side B      06/27/2016   12:34:37
C M
Y K
10 - SATINOFF_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/16 11:52 PM
478 FIU Law Review [Vol. 11:463 
make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for 
other reasons like governmental efficiency.”154 The Court went on to note 
that DOMA diminishes the significance of state-sanctioned marriages and 
tells both the same-sex couples, and society, that their otherwise legitimate 
marriages are not worthy of recognition by the federal government.155 By 
placing same-sex couples in second-tier marriages, DOMA burdened their 
lives in public ways.156
The Supreme Court invalidated the federal statute because there was 
no legitimate purpose that outweighed the practical purpose and effect of 
disparaging and injuring those individuals whom the State of New York, 
through its marriage laws, sought to protect.157 The Court stated that the 
obvious purpose of DOMA was “to impose a disadvantage, a separate 
status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made 
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”158 Although the Court 
never expressly stated the level of judicial review it was applying, its 
language suggests an implicit adoption of heightened scrutiny for 
classifications based on sexual orientation.159 In its reasoning, the Court 
explained that the constitutional guarantee of equality ensures that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a political minority class cannot justify 
unequal treatment of that class.160 The Court implied that classifications 
based on sexual orientation should be subject to heightened judicial review, 
stating that discrimination of such an unusual character requires careful
consideration in determining whether a law is motivated by an improper 
purpose.161 Relying on the Court’s decision in Windsor, the Ninth Circuit 
subsequently held that classifications based on sexual orientation are 
subject to a heightened standard of judicial review.162
Many scholars have taken the position that sexual orientation is a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class and, thus, should be subject to heightened 
judicial review.163 Some scholars have reasoned that sexual orientation 
should be treated as a suspect classification because like race, sexual 
154 Id. at 2694. 
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See id. at 2696. 
158 Id. at 2693. 
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See id. (emphasis added). 
162 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
163 See, e.g., Susannah W. Pollvogt, Marriage Equality, United States v. Windsor, and the 
Crisis in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2014); Mark Strasser, 
Equal Protection, Same-Sex Marriage, and Classifying on the Basis of Sex, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1021, 1027 
(2011).
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orientation has no bearing on an individual’s ability to contribute to society 
and, therefore, should not serve as the basis for a discriminatory law.164 This 
argument is based on several lower courts’ reliance on a suspect 
classification analysis, despite the Supreme Court’s reluctance to explicitly 
do so.165
Additionally, scholars have recognized that the application of 
heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation, and 
explicit acknowledgement of such application, will resolve the 
inconsistencies between lower court decisions and the Supreme Court 
holdings in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor.166 Because the Supreme Court 
has not explicitly articulated the level of judicial review that should apply to 
sexual orientation classifications, it is helpful to consider the position that 
lower courts have taken.167 In applying the factors that the Court has 
established to determine whether a classification should be afforded 
heightened scrutiny, courts have consistently found that all four factors 
support the application of heightened scrutiny.168
C.  Rationale for Applying Heightened Scrutiny 
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly stated the appropriate 
standard of judicial review for classifications based on sexual orientation, it 
has established the factors that should be considered when determining 
whether heightened scrutiny applies.169 The criteria that the Court examines 
are whether the group has suffered from a history of discrimination, 
whether individuals “exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing 
characteristics that define them as a discrete group,” whether the group is a 
minority or lacks political power, and whether the characteristics singling 
out the group for disparate treatment have little relation to legitimate policy 
objectives or to an individual’s “ability to perform or contribute to 
society.”170
The LGBT community has undoubtedly suffered from a history of 
discrimination.171 The first statute prohibiting homosexual conduct dates 
164 See Pollvogt, supra note 163, at 1053. 
165 See id. at 1051. 
166 See Jeremy B. Smith, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should 
Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2813 (2005). 
167 See Kendra LaCour, License to Discriminate: How a Washington Florist Is Making the Case 
for Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Sexual Orientation, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 107, 124 (2014). 
168 See id.
169 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 143. 
170 Id. (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602–03 (1987)); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr. 473 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1985). 
171 See Roberts, supra note 105, at 498. 
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back to the time of King Henry VIII of England.172 The statute provided 
that any homosexual act was “an infamous crime against nature,” and was 
considered a disgrace to the human race.173 Sexual minorities have been 
persecuted throughout history, most notably during World War II.174 In 
Germany, sexual minorities were sent to Nazi concentration camps and 
sentenced to death, simply because of their sexual orientation.175 While 
such large-scale persecution may not occur today, the LGBT community 
still experiences discrimination in public ways.176 Many individuals 
continue to exhibit hostile attitudes toward sexual minorities and perpetuate 
false stereotypes that harm the LGBT community.177
The military, for example, has acknowledged that, “homosexuals have 
historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility.”178
Additionally, the general public has perpetuated negative attitudes toward 
the LGBT community through their use of offensive language to describe 
members of the group.179 Words such as “queer,” “homo,” “fag,” and 
“dyke” are derogatory terms used to convey moral and social inferiority of 
sexual minorities.180 The false stereotypes regarding the LGBT community 
further demonstrate the history of discrimination that sexual minorities have 
experienced.181 Such stereotypes include the erroneous beliefs that sexual 
minorities suffer from mental illness, are likely to molest children, or can 
alter the sexual orientation of individuals with whom they interact.182 These 
false stereotypes have resulted in both public and private discrimination of 
individuals because of their sexual orientation.183 Based on the history of 
discrimination that members of the LGBT community have experienced, 
this factor in the Court’s analysis supports the application of heightened 
scrutiny to sexual orientation discrimination. 
The second factor that the Court examines is whether individuals 
exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define 
them as a discrete group.184 Although homosexuality was long regarded as a 
172 See id.
173 Id.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 Id. at 499. 
179 See id.
180 Id.
181 See id. at 500. 
182 See id.
183 See id. 
184  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 143. 
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psychological disorder by the American Psychiatric Association185 and 
society at large, it is now generally accepted that homosexuality is not a 
psychological or emotional illness that can be cured.186 Scientific studies 
suggest that sexual orientation is not a matter of choice, but rather a matter 
of genetics.187 Some researchers have concluded that neurological and 
hormonal factors during the gestation of a fetus are responsible for 
determining an individual’s sexual orientation.188
While some scientists still question whether sexual orientation is 
biological in nature, it should nevertheless be treated as “immutable” for the 
purposes of this heightened scrutiny analysis.189 Some scholars have argued 
that the immutability requirement refers to traits “so central to a person’s 
identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for 
refusing to change them.”190 This proposition is supported by the Court’s 
decision to apply heightened scrutiny to other classifications that are not 
strictly immutable.191 For example, the Court has applied heightened 
judicial review to gender classifications, despite the fact that individuals can 
alter their sex, thus rendering the trait mutable.192 Furthermore, sexual 
minorities’ preference to engage in sexual relations with members of the 
same sex is a sufficiently obvious and distinguishing characteristic that 
defines members of the LGBT community as a discrete group.193
The third factor, whether the LGBT community is a minority or 
politically powerless, has been a topic of debate among scholars.194 The 
lack of political power among members of the LGBT community is evinced 
by the government-sanctioned discrimination that sexual minorities have 
experienced.195 Such discrimination and moral disapproval has caused many 
sexual minorities to conceal their sexual orientation.196 As a result, the 
LGBT community has historically been unable to express its opposition to 
discriminatory legislation in any meaningful capacity.197 The continued 
existence of discriminatory laws, and the unwillingness of political leaders 
185 See Roberts, supra note 105, at 500. 
186 See id. at 504; see also John Charles Hayes, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle 
of Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C.
L. REV. 375, 380 (1990). 
187 See Roberts, supra note 105, at 506. 
188 See id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See id. at 507. 
194 See id. 
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 See id. at 508. 
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to repeal them, demonstrates the lack of political power that sexual 
minorities possess.198 While some scholars have taken the position that the 
LGBT community has gained significant political power in recent years, 
there are still many pieces of discriminatory legislation that oppress the 
LGBT community.199 Such government-sanctioned legislation is prevalent 
in various arenas, such as public employment, the military, family law, and 
criminal law.200
The final factor that the Court considers when determining if a group 
warrants heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause is 
whether the characteristics distinguishing the group have little relation to 
legitimate policy objectives or to an individual’s ability to perform or 
contribute to society.201 While this factor may have been disputed years ago, 
it is established today that one’s sexual orientation does not inhibit his or 
her ability to contribute to society.202 This factor requires little discussion, 
as it is generally accepted that sexual minorities live happy, well-adjusted 
lives, just as heterosexual individuals do.203 An individual’s sexual 
orientation, much like one’s race or gender, is unrelated to his or her ability 
to contribute to society.204
Based on the research related to the aforementioned factors, the 
argument in favor of applying heightened judicial review to classifications 
based on sexual orientation is compelling.205 Although the Supreme Court 
has yet to articulate that classifications based on sexual orientation are 
subject to heightened scrutiny, the analysis of the factors supports this 
independent conclusion, and many courts have evaluated the criteria and 
recognized the need for heightened protection.206
IV. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A.  Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals Application 
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals are currently split regarding the 
applicability of Batson to sexual orientation discrimination. The Ninth 
Circuit has adopted the position that peremptory strikes used to discriminate 
on the basis of sexual orientation may be challenged under Batson.207 In 
198 See id.
199 See id. at 509. 
200 See Hayes, supra note 186, at 378.
201 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 143. 
202 See Roberts, supra note 105, at 502. 
203 See id.
204 See id. at 503. 
205 See id. at 509. 
206 See id. at 510. 
207 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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SmithKline Beecham Corporation, a suit was brought against Abbott 
Laboratories that contained claims relating to a licensing agreement and the 
pricing of HIV medications.208 During voir dire, Abbott used its first 
peremptory strike to remove the only self-identified gay member of the jury 
pool.209 SmithKline attempted to challenge the strike under Batson, but the 
district judge denied the challenge.210
Applying the three-part inquiry established in Batson, it is apparent 
that impermissible discrimination against a potential juror during voir dire
had occurred. SmithKline provided adequate evidence to establish a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination.211 First, SmithKline produced 
evidence that the excluded juror is a member of an identifiable class 
because: (1) the juror was the only self-identified gay member of the jury 
pool, and (2) the subject matter of the litigation was related to HIV, which 
is a controversial issue within the gay community.212 SmithKline became 
aware of the potential juror’s sexual orientation during voir dire because the 
juror voluntarily revealed that he had a “partner” and referred to his partner 
several times by using the masculine pronoun, “he.”213 The court noted that 
when jury pools contain little diversity, a strike of the sole member of the 
minority group is a pertinent consideration when determining whether a 
prima facie case has been established.214 Thus, the court in SmithKline 
considered the fact that the prospective juror was the only self-identified 
gay member in the jury pool when making its determination.215
Second, Abbott exercised a peremptory challenge against this 
prospective juror.216 Finally, the totality of the circumstances raised an 
inference that the challenge was motivated by the juror’s sexual 
orientation.217 The court found reason to infer that Abbott struck the 
potential juror based on his sexual orientation because of the fear that he 
would be biased by the concern in the LGBT community regarding 
Abbott’s decision to increase the price of its HIV medications.218 The 
Supreme Court has held that when the characteristic of the juror coincides 
with the nature of the litigation, the potential for a discriminatory challenge 
208 See id. at 474. 
209 See id.
210 See id.
211 See id. at 476. 
212 See id.
213 Id. at 474. 
214 See id. at 476. 
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 See id.
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based on that characteristic increases substantially.219
In SmithKline, because the litigation involved a subject matter that is 
of great concern to the LGBT community, the potential for relying on 
impermissible stereotypes during jury selection significantly increased.220
After SmithKline produced evidence to support the three-part inquiry 
established in Batson, the court concluded that the party successfully raised 
an inference of purposeful discrimination.221 After SmithKline established a 
prima facie case of intentional discrimination, Abbott did not offer any 
nondiscriminatory reason for excusing the juror, even when provided the 
opportunity to do so by the court.222 The court determined that SmithKline 
successfully made a showing of purposeful discrimination and that the juror 
was struck only because of his sexual orientation.223
Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Windsor, the Ninth Circuit 
found that because classifications based on sexual orientation are subject to 
heightened scrutiny, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination 
based on sexual orientation during voir dire.224 In making this 
determination, the court analogized the analysis in SmithKline to that of the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of another landmark Supreme Court decision, 
Lawrence v. Texas.225 The Ninth Circuit, in Witt v. Department of Air 
Force, balanced three factors in interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Lawrence to implicitly require a heightened level of judicial scrutiny 
with respect to substantive due process.226
In applying those three factors to SmithKline, the Ninth Circuit first 
observed that the Court in Windsor, like that in Lawrence, did not examine 
the potential rational reasons for the law in question, as it normally would 
for classifications that are subject to rational basis judicial review.227
Because the Court in Windsor did not consider hypothetical rationales for 
the law, but rather evaluated the essence, stated purpose, and actual effect 
of the law, the decision seems to suggest that the Court was applying 
heightened judicial review.228
As to Witt’s second factor, the court stated that “[j]ust as Lawrence
required that a legitimate state interest justify the harm imposed by the 
Texas law, the critical part of Windsor begins by demanding that 
219 See id.
220 See id. at 477. 
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 See id. at 478. 
224 See id. at 489. 
225 See id. at 480. 
226 See id.
227 See id. at 481. 
228 See id. at 481–82. 
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Congress’s purpose ‘justify disparate treatment of the group.’”229 The court 
concluded that if the Supreme Court was applying rational basis review, it 
would not have identified a legitimate state interest to justify the unequal 
treatment of sexual minorities.230 In analyzing the third factor, the court in 
Witt concluded that Lawrence must have required heightened scrutiny 
because it cited and relied on heightened scrutiny case law in its opinion.231
Because Windsor relies on one rational basis case and two heightened 
scrutiny cases, this factor is not dispositive, yet was found to suggest the 
Court’s application of heightened scrutiny.232
After applying the three factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Witt,
the SmithKline court concluded that Windsor requires careful consideration 
of the actual purposes and resulting effects of laws that discriminate on the 
basis of sexual orientation in order to ensure that courts neither send nor 
reaffirm messages that stigmatize members of the LGBT community.233
Although Witt was decided on the grounds of due process, rather than equal 
protection, the Ninth Circuit’s parallel interpretation supports applying 
heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications under the Equal 
Protection Clause as well.234
The Eighth Circuit, in Ehrmann, and the Eleventh Circuit, in Sneed,
have taken the opposite position, expressing serious doubt that the scope of 
Batson extends beyond race and gender.235 In Ehrmann, the defendant was 
charged with various crimes relating to the possession and distribution of 
methamphetamine and ecstasy.236 Ehrmann raised a Batson challenge 
during jury selection on the grounds that the government struck a potential 
juror because of his sexual orientation.237 The district court denied the 
challenge, questioning Batson’s applicability to sexual orientation.238 The 
court noted that neither the United States Supreme Court, nor the Eighth 
Circuit, had ever held that sexual orientation qualifies as a protected class 
under Batson.239 The court therefore refused to interpret Batson in a manner 
that extended to sexual orientation.240 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held 
that peremptory challenges based solely on sexual orientation may not be 
229 Id. at 482. 
230 See id.
231 See id. at 483. 
232 See id.
233 See id.
234 See id. at 489.
235 See United States v. Ehrmann, 421 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2005). 
236 See id. at 777. 
237 See id. at 781. 
238 See id.
239 See id. at 782. 
240 See id.
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challenged under the Batson standard.241
In Sneed, the defendant appealed from the denial of his habeas 
petition.242 He argued that he had ineffective assistance of counsel because 
his attorney failed to object to the exclusion of homosexuals from the venire 
and petit jury.243 The Eleventh Circuit held that Sneed did not demonstrate 
that homosexuals were underrepresented and, therefore, failed to make his 
discriminatory jury selection claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.244 The court further noted that the defendant failed 
to provide any evidence regarding the sexual orientation of the members of 
the jury pool and how many homosexuals, if any, were among the venire or 
petit jury.245
The Ninth Circuit reached the correct decision and all circuits should 
unanimously adopt its analysis. Based on its explicit reading of Windsor as 
authorizing heightened scrutiny for classifications based on sexual 
orientation, it logically follows that the Batson analysis should extend to 
peremptory challenges based on sexual orientation.246 Sexual minorities 
have experienced a history of discrimination and exclusion and, therefore, 
should be afforded the same protections as individuals who are 
discriminated against based on their race and gender during voir dire.247
Although the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits declined to extend Batson
to discrimination based on sexual orientation, they did not provide any 
rationale for doing so, aside from the fact that the Supreme Court has not 
yet held that sexual orientation qualifies as a protected class under 
Batson.248 Scholars have argued, however, that “[n]othing in the decisions 
of Batson or J.E.B. indicates that the Court intends to limit equal protection 
rights against improper exclusion from jury service to strikes motivated by 
race and gender—these are simply the only issues the Court has chosen to 
address directly.”249 Because the Supreme Court has not articulated whether 
Batson prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, the trend of 
lower courts applying heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation 
classifications should guide this analysis.250
241 See id.
242 See Sneed v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F. App’x 20, 22 (11th Cir. 2012). 
243 See id.
244 See id. at 27. 
245 See id.
246 See generally SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d471 (9th Cir. 2014).
247 See Claus, supra note 110, at 168–69. 
248 See United States v. Ehrmann, 421 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2005). 
249 Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and Beyond: The Paradoxical Quest for Reasoned 
Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Process, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 947, 967 (1994). 
250 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 844 (2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 
862, 896 (Iowa 2009); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 884 (N.M. 2013). 
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B.  Extending Batson to Sexual Orientation 
Sexual orientation discrimination should be prohibited under the 
Batson analysis because it is a form of gender discrimination, which is 
already barred by the Court’s decision in J.E.B.251 By definition, if conduct 
is prohibited when engaged in by a person of one gender, yet is acceptable 
when engaged in by a person of the opposite gender, then such a prohibition 
is discriminatorily based on gender.252 This type of discrimination occurs 
regularly when members of the LGBT community engage in conduct that, 
but for their gender, would be tolerated by society.253 Take, for example, the 
issue of same-sex marriage that has recently attracted a significant amount 
of legal attention.254 While a man and a woman are permitted to marry each 
other, until recently, the same conduct was prohibited when engaged in by 
two men or two women.255 Homosexual and transgender individuals have 
been discriminated against because their sexual preferences do not conform 
to society’s view of traditional gender roles.256 The Court has held that the 
constitutional command forbidding intentional exclusion applies to any 
cognizable group in the community that may be the subject of prejudice.257
The LGBT community has experienced a well-documented history of 
purposeful discrimination and has long been a politically powerless group, 
which is evinced by the passage and enforcement of many statutes and 
policies that have stripped them of rights as individuals.258 Some historical 
examples of discrimination based on sexual orientation include denial of the 
fundamental right to marry and employment protection under the law.259
While the prejudicial attitudes toward race and gender have not been 
identical to those toward sexual minorities, the similarities between such 
experiences outweigh the differences.260 The Court has held that all 
individuals, when selected to serve on a jury, have the right not to be 
removed solely based on discriminatory and stereotypical reasons that serve 
to perpetuate patterns of historical discrimination.261 The LGBT community 
251 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.127 (1994). 
252 See Koppelman, supra note 21, at 208. 
253 See id.
254 See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
255 See id.
256 See Sandi Farrell, Reconsidering the Gender-Equality Perspective for Understanding LGBT 
Rights, 13 LAW & SEXUALITY 605, 619 (2004). 
257 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204–05 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986). 
258 See Claus, supra note 110, at 168–69. 
259 See id. at 161–62, 169. 
260 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994). 
261 See id. at 141–42. 
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is undoubtedly an identifiable group that has been the subject of 
discrimination throughout history and, therefore, deserves the same 
protections that are afforded to victims of discrimination on the basis of 
race and gender.262
Even if the Court determines that sexual orientation discrimination is 
not a form of gender discrimination, Batson should still apply to sexual 
orientation discrimination because the similarities between gender and 
sexual orientation discrimination support the extension of Batson to the 
latter class.263 Additionally, the implications of Windsor subjecting 
classifications based on sexual orientation to heightened judicial review 
support allowing Batson challenges on the basis of sexual orientation.264
The parallels between discrimination on the basis of gender and 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation are striking.265 Both types 
of discrimination are rooted in the same presumption—that traditional 
gender roles should be enforced.266 As the LGBT community has become 
more visible in society, they have undeniably experienced the same type of 
discrimination that women have experienced throughout history.267 These 
individuals have experienced difficulties entering various professions, 
including the military, police or fire departments, medicine, law, and 
business.268 According to stereotypical gender roles, gay men have been 
expected to undertake careers in cosmetics and fashion, while lesbians have 
been excluded from the workforce and expected to fulfill their role as 
homemakers.269 Similar to discrimination based on gender, sexual 
orientation discrimination is based on the preconceived gender role to 
which an individual is expected to conform.270
Much like discrimination based on gender, discrimination based on 
sexual orientation is a recent phenomenon because it is becoming more 
socially acceptable for individuals to openly acknowledge their sexual 
preferences, without fear of being completely ostracized from society.271
Historically, individuals of the LGBT community would remain silent 
regarding their sexual preferences, which was rarely a matter of inquiry 
during voir dire, because of the stigmatization surrounding sexual 
262 See Claus, supra note 110, at 168–69. 
263 See Shay, supra note 6, at 451. 
264 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014). 
265 See Hasday, supra note 23, at 1731–32. 
266 See Amelia A. Craig, Musing About Discrimination Based on Sex and Sexual Orientation as 
“Gender Role” Discrimination, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 105, 106 (1995). 
267 See id. at 108. 
268 See id.
269 See id.
270 See id. at 111. 
271 See Shay, supra note 6, at 444–45. 
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minorities.272 In recent years, however, some states have passed 
antidiscrimination provisions to protect the LGBT community, and the 
public opinion regarding LGBT issues has become progressively 
supportive.273 Over time, sexual minorities have become less fearful of 
discrimination; therefore, discussions regarding sexual orientation during 
voir dire are becoming increasingly commonplace.274
Another similarity between gender and sexual orientation is that both 
are immutable characteristics, requiring additional protection from 
discrimination.275 While some debate continues over the immutability of 
sexual orientation, courts have acknowledged that individuals do not choose 
their sexual preferences and should not be subjected to discrimination on 
such a basis.276 In Watkins v. U.S. Army, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, 
“sexual orientation is immutable for the purposes of the equal protection 
doctrine. Although the causes of homosexuality are not fully understood, 
scientific research indicates that we have little control over our sexual 
orientation and that, once acquired, our sexual orientation is largely 
impervious to change.”277 Accordingly, the reasoning of J.E.B., which 
prohibits peremptory strikes exclusively based on gender, should similarly 
forbid deliberate discrimination solely based on sexual orientation.278
In addition to the overwhelming parallels between gender and sexual 
orientation, both classes are subject to a heightened standard of judicial 
review.279 The Court in Windsor, while not expressly stating the level of 
judicial review it was applying, implicitly adopted heightened scrutiny for 
classifications based on sexual orientation.280 The Court noted that 
discrimination of such an unusual character requires careful consideration
in determining whether a law is motivated by an improper purpose.281 In 
addition to its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor,
the Ninth Circuit considered whether the relevant class has historically been 
excluded from jury service and whether that class has suffered from 
invidious group stereotypes.282 The Ninth Circuit’s reading of Windsor
272 See id. at 416.
273 See id. at 411. 
274 See id. 
275 See e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988), opinion
withdrawn on reh’g, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989). 
276 See, e.g., id.
277 Id.
278 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994). 
279 See generally SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d471 (9th Cir. 2014); see
also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
280 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
281 See id. (emphasis added). 
282 See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 471. 
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resulted in its conclusion that the Supreme Court mandated that 
classifications based on sexual orientation be subject to heightened 
scrutiny.283 Because both gender and sexual orientation classifications are 
subject to heightened judicial review, the rationale of Windsor suggests that 
the Batson analysis should also be extended to peremptory strikes based on 
sexual orientation.284
Windsor represents the beginning of the Supreme Court’s review of 
classifications that discriminate based on sexual orientation. As the area of 
sexual orientation discrimination continues to evolve in the legal field, the 
Court will, once again, be confronted with determining the standard of 
judicial review for sexual orientation classifications.285 Based on the 
parallels between gender and sexual orientation as identifiable classes, it is 
likely that the Court will explicitly hold that the standard of review for 
sexual orientation classifications is heightened scrutiny.286 Gender, like 
sexual orientation, was originally subject to rational basis review, before 
evolving into heightened scrutiny.287 If history is any indication of the 
future, the Court’s sexual orientation equal protection jurisprudence is 
likely to develop into explicit application of heightened judicial review. 
While the similarities between gender and sexual orientation support 
extending Batson to sexual orientation, there is one fundamental difference 
that must be addressed—race and gender can typically be observed during 
voir dire, while sexual orientation generally requires specific inquiry to 
ascertain.288 LGBT identity is often not readily apparent and, therefore, 
identifying anti-gay bias differs significantly from identifying racial or 
gender bias.289 The Supreme Court has held, however, that minor 
differences between classes do not overpower the similarities between the 
experiences they have shared.290
The differences between sexual orientation discrimination and 
discrimination on the basis of race or gender raise the question of whether 
inquiry into a person’s sexual orientation is appropriate during voir dire.
Some courts have taken the position that it is never appropriate to inquire 
into a person’s sexual orientation during voir dire.291 While judges have 
broad discretion in determining the scope of questioning, “the purpose of 
the voir dire is to ascertain disqualifications, not to afford individual 
283 See id.
284 See generally id. 
285 See Lynd, supra note 101, at 286. 
286 See id.
287 See id.
288 See Shay, supra note 6, at 445.
289 See id. at 426. 
290 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994). 
291 See People v. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1280 (2000). 
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analysis in depth to permit a party to choose a jury that fits into some mold 
that he believes appropriate for his case.”292 Overall, there is not a 
consensus among courts regarding the permissibility of inquiring into 
potential jurors’ sexual orientation during voir dire.293 Courts have 
generally agreed, however, that individuals are entitled to some degree of 
privacy when they are summoned for jury service.294 As such, inquiring into 
a prospective juror’s sexual orientation is likely prohibited when the 
information is not essential to the case or when there are other, less 
intrusive methods of ascertaining juror bias or impartiality.295
While some scholars have argued that the practical implications of 
expanding Batson to include classifications based on sexual orientation may 
lead to difficulties in preserving jurors’ equal protection and privacy rights, 
the primary interests at stake are, and must continue to be, those of the 
defendant.296 Although, as mentioned above, there are some intrinsic 
differences between race and gender-based discrimination during voir dire,
such differences do not overpower the similar experiences they have 
shared.297 While some have proposed that individual state court rules may 
be amended to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation during 
voir dire, this solution does not adequately protect the LGBT community, 
as the extension of Batson would.298
V. CONCLUSION
Batson should be extended to sexual orientation discrimination 
because it is simply a form of gender discrimination.299 Alternatively, the 
parallels between gender and sexual orientation support extending Batson to 
sexual orientation discrimination during voir dire.300 Furthermore, the 
Court’s decision in Windsor, which applied heightened scrutiny to 
classifications based on sexual orientation, supports extending Batson to 
such classifications.301 For these reasons, peremptory strikes based on 
sexual orientation violate the Equal Protection Clause and may be 
challenged under Batson.302
292  Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir. 1967). 
293 See Lynd, supra note 101, at 246. 
294 See id. at 258. 
295 See id.
296 See Last, supra note 47, at 332. 
297 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994). 
298 See Last, supra note 47, at 334. 
299 See generally Koppelman, supra note 21.
300 See Hasday, supra note 23, at 1731–32. 
301 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
302 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
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Relying on the reasoning of Batson and the equal protection analysis in 
Windsor, the Ninth Circuit correctly held that peremptory strikes used to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation may be challenged under 
Batson.303 Much like race and gender, a party may establish a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by 
showing that he or she is a member of a cognizable group that is subject to 
discrimination and that the opposing party exercised their peremptory 
challenges to remove members of that cognizable group.304 The striking 
party would then be required to offer a neutral, nondiscriminatory 
explanation for challenging those jurors.305 The court would ultimately 
determine, based on the record, whether the challenging party has made a 
showing of purposeful discrimination.306
If Batson is not expanded to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination 
during voir dire, it will harm the litigants, excluded jurors, and community 
as a whole.307 The Supreme Court has held that “with the exception of 
voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most 
significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.”308
Permitting parties to exercise peremptory challenges discriminatorily based 
on an individual’s sexual orientation will deprive ordinary citizens of the 
opportunity to participate in the judicial system and may result in a loss of 
respect for the law.309
Although discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin are 
beyond the scope of this Note, the arguments presented in support of 
expanding Batson to include sexual orientation discrimination raise 
potential implications for other classifications. In order to preserve the 
equal protection right of prospective jurors to participate in the 
administration of justice, striking jurors of other identifiable classes that are 
subject to strict or heightened scrutiny should be impermissible as well.310
The United States Code Annotated provides that “[n]o citizen shall be 
excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the 
United States or in the Court of International Trade on account of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.”311 Based on this 
provision, Batson would likely apply to discrimination on the basis of 
303 See id. at 476. 
304 See id.
305 See id.
306 See id.
307 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 
U.S. 127, 140 (1994). 
308  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991). 
309 See id.
310 See Carlson, supra note 249, at 967. 
311  28 U.S.C.A. § 1862 (West). 
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 106 Side A      06/27/2016   12:34:37
37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 106 Side A      06/27/2016   12:34:37
C M
Y K
10 - SATINOFF_FINAL 6.12.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/16 11:52 PM
2016] Coming Out of the Venire 493 
religious affiliation during voir dire.312 Some scholars have argued that the 
free exercise of religion is a fundamental right and, thus, should be subject 
to strict scrutiny.313 Based on this argument, because religion-based 
peremptory challenges are not narrowly tailored and rely on stereotypical 
assumptions, they violate strict scrutiny and should be eliminated under the 
Batson standard as well.314
The Supreme Court has suggested that the Batson analysis may also 
apply to peremptory challenges based solely on an individual’s ethnicity or 
national origin.315 In Hernandez v. New York, the Supreme Court noted that 
if the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude Latinos or 
Hispanics from the jury solely based on their ethnicity, the strike would 
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.316 The Court’s dicta 
suggests that the Batson analysis also extends to peremptory challenges 
based exclusively on an individual’s ethnicity or national origin.317 The 
Court explained that for certain ethnic groups, “proficiency in a particular 
language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an 
equal protection analysis.”318
In his second inaugural address, President Obama recognized that the 
civil rights movement for racial equality, the women’s rights movement, 
and the gay rights movement are all fundamental to the achievement of 
equality in America.319 Each of the aforementioned social movements 
involve overlapping principles that are rooted in the Constitution and the 
Declaration of Independence.320 As such, classifications that single out 
individuals from each of these cognizable groups for disparate treatment 
should be afforded the same protections under the law.321
312 See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. 
Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and First Amendment Analysis, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 191, 209 (1995). 
313 See, e.g., id. 
314 See id.
315 See Carlson, supra note 249, at 962. 
316 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991). 
317 See Carlson, supra note 249, at 962. 
318 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 354. 
319 See Hasday, supra note 23, at 1732. 
320 See id.
321 See Claus, supra note 110, at 168–69. 
